Cryptocurrencies and their underlying blockchain technology have begun to transform numerous industries. Although we have seen an uptrend in the types of created cryptocurrencies, it has not yet translated into mainstream adoption., In this paper, we use value-sensitive design principles to identify values among current and potential cryptocurrency adopters. Using Bitcoin as the context for this qualitative research study, we use grounded theory analytical techniques to discover manifested values among users and non-users. We develop a cryptocurrency value-sensitive design framework to summarize our results. As our main contribution, we offer a research agenda based on the cryptocurrency stakeholders' underlying value system. This agenda can help information systems scholars apply this value-sensitive design perspective to their own cryptocurrency research.
C ommunications of the A I S ssociation for nformation ystems
In this study, we have three research objectives. First, we focus on determining the original intended design values that Nakamoto (2018) (i.e., Bitcoin's creator) 1 envisioned from available documentation. Second, we focus on discovering cryptocurrency use's underlying values using the principles of valuesensitive design (VSD) among Bitcoin users and non-users. For example, Bitcoin's use for illicit purposes creates friction with the values of Bitcoin's decentralized and trustless design that facilitates anonymous transactions across geographic and economic boundaries. Third, we focus on proposing a research framework based on the intended values and the manifested values we discover. The resultant research agenda can guide future research for cryptocurrencies and decentralized applications.
To achieve our research objectives, we drew on the VSD approach (Friedman, Kahn, & Borning, 2008) to conduct a qualitative research study on Bitcoin use. By applying VSD, we identified benefits and harms in using Bitcoin and associate them with eight values that support Bitcoin use (access, laissez faire, efficiency, self-governance, ownership and property, privacy, responsible innovation, and trust). We show how the original values that Nakamoto (2008) embedded in Bitcoin's design differ from the manifested values of practice. For instance, even though Nakamoto designed Bitcoin to facilitate financial inclusion, people have not been able to participate in the cryptocurrency economy due to the difficulties they face in acquiring and using Bitcoin. Others have expressed concern regarding its use for criminal activities such as drug trafficking, prostitution, and money laundering, which have stigmatized Bitcoin in recent years. This negative association has deterred some individuals from considering using the currency.
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we summarize relevant IS literature on cryptocurrencies, blockchain, and VSD methodology. In Section 3, we present the research method we followed. In Section 4, we describe our results. In Section 5, we present the cryptocurrency VSD research framework based on our analysis. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude by highlighting key findings, limitations, and future research avenues.
2 Literature Review
Cryptocurrency IS Research
Most research on cryptocurrency to date has focused on Bitcoin. Researchers have begun using Bitcoin to provide a novel research context for extending IS theories about how individuals (Connolly & Kick, 2015) and organizations (Catalini & Tucker, 2017) adopt and use new technologies. At the organizational level, Bitcoin's adoption as a payment method critically depends on vendors that accept Bitcoin in exchange for goods or services (Connolly & Kick, 2015) . Early organizational adopters that accept Bitcoin exhibit a higher IT readiness, innovativeness, and social media presence than their non-adopting counterparts. At the individual level, through the theoretical lens of the diffusion of innovations, Catalini and Tucker (2017) showed that natural early adopters (NEAs) may abandon a new technology such as Bitcoin if they believe the advantages they gain from adopting it and their feelings about being unique have diminished. Hawlitschek et al. (2018) focused on how actors may leverage blockchain-based systems' trust-free properties in the sharing economy and highlighted how user trust in blockchain-based, trust-free applications differs significantly from trust in the sharing economy. Bitcoin serves as an appropriate context in which to study stigma's implications. For this reason, Ingram Bogusz and Morisse (2018) used the Bitcoin context to study the role that ideology and digital infrastructure play in how entrepreneurs form stigma responses and illustrated the difficulties entrepreneurs experience when distancing themselves from stigmatized digital infrastructure and their communities. Proposing a shift from normative regulation to market regulation of the peer review system, IS researchers have proposed a token-based peer review payment system to clear the backlog in the review pipeline by compensating peers for their reviews (Avital, 2018) . Some studies have investigated how to improve Bitcoin's technical properties by enhancing the underlying cryptography (Reid & Harrigan, 2011) , proof-of-work algorithms (Saini, 2018) , anonymity and privacy characteristics, and power conservation and efficiency (Ballis, 2017) . 1 In this paper, we sometimes use "he" to refer to Nakamoto; however, we acknowledge Nakamoto's identity remains unknown. Further, we also acknowledge that Nakamoto may actually refer to several people and that many individuals had some part in developing Bitcoin despite referring to Bitcoin's "creator" (rather than creators). Indeed, though Satoshi disappeared in 2009, the next generation of core developers of the Bitcoin ecosystem have continued to develop, design, and feature rollouts of the Bitcoin ecosystem.
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Paper 27 Other studies have focused on economic factors such as price volatility (Polasik et al., 2015) , exchange rates (Li & Wang, 2017) , cryptocurrency risks and returns (Liu & Tsyvinski, 2018) , and valuations (Hayes, 2017; Liu & Tsyvinski, 2018; Mai et al., 2018) . Legal scholars have focused on regulatory concerns such as preventing money laundering and illicit anonymous usage that cryptocurrencies present (Jacquez, 2016; Twomey, 2013) .
Cryptocurrencies provide a rich potential context for interdisciplinary theoretical collaboration because they span many areas such as law, economics, and finance. Yet, IS research on cryptocurrency remains sparse. We believe that the IS community has just begun to scratch the surface of developing theoretical perspectives to understand the complexity of the socio-technical issues that cryptocurrency presents.
Blockchain Research Frameworks on Design, Adoption, and Use
While research in mainstream journals has rarely studied cryptocurrency adoption, much more research has examined blockchain's (i.e., the technology underlying cryptocurrency) design, adoption, and use. Indeed, several research papers have presented blockchain research frameworks in IS and computer science. Risius and Spohrer (2017) presented a blockchain research framework based on extensively surveying IS papers on the topic. They also presented a multilevel, multidisciplinary research framework for users and society, intermediaries, and platforms that they adapted from the social media research agenda that Aral, Dellarocas, and Godes (2013) developed. Yli-Huumo, Ko, Choi, Park, and Smolander (2016) systematically reviewed the blockchain literature and classified papers based on concepts such as security, wasted resources, usability, throughput, privacy, and smart contracts. Mendling et al. (2018) discussed future research directions and the challenges of blockchain adoption based on the business process management lifecycle. Similarly, Gökalp, Gökalp, Çoban, and Eren (2018) analyzed challenges and opportunities for blockchain technologies in healthcare by studying how patients can share private health data among themselves. Another stream of blockchain-related research has focused on how to standardize health information databases by anonymizing user data (Peterson, Deeduvanu, Kanjamala, & Boles, 2016; Yue, Wang, Jin, Li, & Jiang, 2016) . Several scholars have proposed design-based approaches for blockchain applications such as know-your-customer (KYC) optimization (Moyano & Ross, 2017) , real-world asset trading (Cholewa & Shanmugam, 2017) , fraud prevention (Hyvärinen, Risius, & Friis, 2017) , automated financial contracts (Egelund-Müller, Elsman, Henglein, & Ross, 2017) , accounting and assurance services (Dai & Vasarhelyi, 2017) , and peer-review systems (Avital, 2018) .
However, these research frameworks neither focus on cryptocurrencies nor take a VSD perspective. In Section 2.3, we present the VSD literature relevant to our study.
Value-sensitive Design
VSD is a value-oriented design methodology that researchers in human-computer interaction commonly adopt (Deng, Joshi, & Galliers, 2016) . The IS research community has used VSD to study privacyenhancing tools in browsers (Xu, Crossler, & Bélanger, 2012) , informed consent in Web-based interactions (Friedman, Howe, & Felte, 2002) , and marginalization and empowerment in crowdsourcing communities (Deng et al., 2016) . Across these studies, applying a VSD approach has enabled researchers to develop design recommendations, research agendas, and suggestions to improve design and practice. A theoretically grounded approach to technology design, VSD focuses on explaining how we can account for human values such as autonomy, fairness, and transparency in computer technology design (Deng et al., 2016) . VSD has a three-part methodology that includes conceptual, empirical, and technical investigations to guide design (Friedman et al., 2008) .
In the empirical investigation, researchers focus on users' actual or potential responses to technical artifacts and use contexts. Conceptual investigation involves theoretically studying values. In the conceptual investigation phase, researchers use data gathered during the empirical investigation to identify the values involved in the interactions between stakeholders and technology. The conceptual stage relies on previous research to clearly define relevant values. During the technology investigation stage, researchers focus on the technology and aim to understand how technical features facilitate, support, or hinder the values that they identified in the conceptual investigation. This stage can facilitate the technology's design or redesign to better accommodate the desirable values by suggesting alternatives or improvements. Designers can conduct the three investigations recursively in that findings from new investigations can build on earlier results. As a result, one would need a multiphase study to fill in gaps discovered in earlier results. Consistent with earlier VSD research (Friedman et al., 2008; Simpson & Weiner, 1989) , we follow the Oxford English Dictionary in defining value as: "The principles or standards of a person or society, the personal or societal judgment of what is valuable and important in life". Value-sensitive IS discourse has emphasized the good, rights, obligations, virtue, moral judgment, truth, and ethics. However, there is often a trade-off between system usability and values. Usability refers to a system's characteristics that make it functional, easy to learn and use, consistent, and easily recoverable from errors. However, even with usable systems, some people might not find the systems to be socially acceptable given their moral values.
Designers can accommodate both usability and human values that have ethical importance in the same design. Four paired relationships exist between usability and human values with ethical importance (Friedman et al., 2008) . The first relationship covers designs good for usability and for human values with ethical import. For example, browser designs that offer efficient cookie management promote informed consent and privacy. The second relationship covers designs good for human values with ethical import at the expense of usability. Two-factor security designs, where users must use two forms of authentication to access a system, exemplify this relationship. Such systems support privacy and security. Nevertheless, some people may find that they become unwieldy to use, and the nuisance factor may push them away. The third relationship covers designs that require good usability to support ethically important human values. For example, a fair national election system that uses computerized voting systems requires all voting-age citizens to use the system. The fourth relationship covers designs good for usability that may come at the expense of human values with ethical importance. For example, Bitcoin seems to exemplify this relationship: the cryptocurrency provides an efficient monetary system but, due to speculation, has high price volatility and supports criminal and immoral activity at the expense of human values (e.g., honesty, trustworthiness, and security) (Martin, 2014) . Accordingly, we need to remain aware of the relationships between usability and human values. At times, the two support each other, while, at other times, one may need to pursue a closer alignment between them.
Past literature on designing information systems with VSD principles in mind has focused on IT artifacts in organizations such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk and Internet browsers, and researchers have primarily studied these tools' use from a usability perspective. In this study, we investigate cryptocurrencies' empirical and conceptual underlying values using Bitcoin as a case study. Similarly, as we discuss above, researchers have derived prior research frameworks on the blockchain either from a detailed literature survey, a meta-analysis across multiple domains, or through a design lens. We present a value-based framework that can guide future research and efforts to design cryptocurrency-based applications.
Research Method
We carried out a qualitative study in which we focused on understanding how Bitcoin users and non-users perceive the cryptocurrency and explored their reasons for choosing to adopt or avoid it. To apply valuesensitive design, Friedman et al. (2008) recommend that, once researchers identify a system's key stakeholders, they should systematically identify its benefits and harms for each stakeholder group. With this list of benefits and harms in hand, the researchers can then map these aspects onto corresponding value categories and identify potential value conflicts. In the final step, the researchers integrate value considerations into guidelines that inform system design. We employ a similar approach to identify the values associated with Bitcoin use. Based on the context of our study, each value represents a benefit to a user or a harm (or challenge). Further, we group these values into value categories that inform a VSDbased research agenda for improving cryptocurrencies.
Data Collection
We collected data in three phases between 2016 and 2018. As is customary in qualitative research, we employed a hybrid approach in which we conducted inductive-deductive coding and developed themes. In doing so, we could develop the interview protocol for each phase by drawing on the previous one's results (Glaser & Strauss, 2017) . Specifically, we sought to improve our ongoing data collection and analysis by using results from prior phases to identify conceptual gaps we wanted to explore.
In the first phase, we conducted a focus group study in which interviewed 12 prominent members of a nationally recognized Bitcoin meetup group in South Florida who organize meetings on meetup.com. The meetup group, which mostly included Bitcoin stakeholders such as application developers and cryptocurrency entrepreneurs, had over 2,000 members who actively promoted cryptocurrency in the southeastern United States. However, active members in other meetups did not respond to our interview requests, so we could only interview participants from this one group. In the second phase, we focused on understanding Bitcoin's use outside this meetup group. In particular, we focused on understanding why some individuals did not either hold or use it at all. Using Qualtrics software, we emailed interview questions to 110 randomly chosen students enrolled in the evening MBA and BBA programs at a large university in the southeastern United States.
In the third phase, we focused on better understanding the stakeholder perspective. To do so, we interviewed key participants from across the broader cryptocurrency ecosystem. We included individuals based on the following criteria: 1) they were professionals who participated in the cryptocurrency ecosystem on a day-to-day basis and 2) they understood the technology and had a major role in the cryptocurrency community (e.g., as miners, investors, application developers, media practitioners, or researchers). We personally contacted about 100 stakeholders through professional forums, Facebook groups, Reddit groups, industry panels, and LinkedIn. In all, 41 subjects that we contacted by email consented to email interviews. Appendix A and Appendix B detail each stage of our interview protocol and the demographics of these interview subjects, respectively.
Data Analysis
We analyzed our data in two phases. In the first phase, we determined the original values that Nakamoto (2008) embedded in Bitcoin's design by identifying the design features he introduced in his white paper and mapped them onto their respective value categories. Accordingly, we identified five intended design values in Bitcoin: decentralization, efficiency, trust, ownership and property, and privacy. 
Value

Design features Implementation
Decentralization Decentralized design A model that supports two things: a foolproof distributed validation of transactions and prevention of double spending.
Irreversible transactions
A blockchain records transactions via a verification process that users cannot reverse or remove from the blockchain.
Transparency
A publicly available and accessible transaction log in the form of a ledger (i.e., blockchain). Any user or program can validate a transaction or the balances available given the user's private/public key combinations.
Efficiency
Disintermediation
The design eliminates trusted third-party mediators such as financial institutions to enable peer-to-peer transfer.
Combination and splitting of value
Transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs, which allows users to split and combine value.
Reclaiming of disk space
The design saves hard disk space by compacting old blocks and discarding spent transaction records.
Low transaction costs
The design reduces transaction costs by eliminating mediators and reversible transactions.
Trust
Trust-free Transaction validation based on cryptographic proof rather than other forms of trust.
Double-spending problem solution
The design eliminates fraud by preventing users from simultaneously sending the same payment to multiple peers.
Time-stamp server Servers confirm each block's validity, which prevents users from manipulating the transactions' order.
Simplified payment verification
The design reliably verifies at most 50 percent of the hash power-that is, the total network's mining power follows the correct algorithm for validating transactions.
Ownership and property Incentives
Nodes participate in the mining function and receive rewards new coins on the network for doing so.
Privacy
Pseudo-anonymity
Parties have limited access to information about other involved parties (individuals who transact need not disclose their identities on the network). In the second phase, we analyzed the data we collected from all stakeholders to determine the values that users and non-users held about Bitcoin. We mapped these values onto research themes to form the cryptocurrency VSD framework that we present in Section 5. To conduct this analysis, we used NVIVO 12 to independently code the transcribed interview responses from the members of the Bitcoin meetup group and the text from the email interviews. We inductively derived factors we considered the benefits and harms of Bitcoin adoption (Richards, 2014) . Applying analytical grounded theory techniques (refer Appendix C), we developed open codes that represented Bitcoin's benefits and harms and axial codes for the user value categories underlying them (Strauss & Corbin, 1994 . We tested for inter-rater reliability (IRR) once we completed the coding. Among the coders, after three iterations, we attained an IRR of 95 percent. Cohen's kappa was 0.79, which exceeds the recommended threshold of 0.75 (Eugenio & Glass, 2004; McHugh 2012) . We then further grouped the value categories into selective codes to represent research themes and used these codes to develop our VSD framework for analyzing cryptocurrencies.
To test our coding schema's validity and reliability (i.e., open axial codes and selective codes), three doctoral students independently validated our coding schema using a two-stage q-sorting process. The coding schema included code definitions with examples from our previous coding round. The doctoral candidates independently categorized the open codes (values) into axial codes (value categories). Then, they categorized the axial codes into selective codes (research themes). When their initial IRR did not reach 75 percent, we revised the coding schema by merging codes and revisiting the literature to refine code definitions. We then repeated the q-sort exercise with the students a second time, and they obtained an IRR greater than 75 percent and a Cohen's kappa greater than 0.75. We describe our grounded theory-based analytics in detail in Appendix C.
To identify user categories, we classified our respondents into user and non-user groups by clustering individual respondents based on the values (axial codes) and value categories they expressed. We identified three user groups: innovators, conventional users, and sensitive transaction users. Further, we identified two non-user groups: potential adopters (non-users who would likely adopt Bitcoin in the future) and non-adopters (individuals who did not use Bitcoin and would likely never do so). We report the results in Table 2 . We describe each value in detail in Appendix D. 
Results
We present our results in two parts. First, we describe how individuals vary in their access to cryptocurrencies and regulated payment systems. We illustrate how bitcoin adoption is a continuum of user involvement and transactions spanning this spectrum. We then explain the top three values across the different user categories. Second, we discuss the value categories underlying Bitcoin adoption and use in practice to understand how Bitcoin's implementation reflects its designer's intended values and how users have interpreted these values (refer to Table 2 ). Overall, we found that the respondents shared eight general value types associated with Bitcoin use: access, efficiency, laissez faire, ownership and property, privacy, responsible innovation, self-governance, and trust. Compared to Bitcoin's designer's intended values, users perceived four additional value types: access, self-governance, laissez faire, and responsible innovation. While the designer's intended values benefit the cryptocurrency ecosystem, the resulting harms (challenges) that occurred after implementation created tension with the designer's intended values. For example, the designer's intended privacy to be a benefit that users would value. However, the privacy that Bitcoin provides does not allow one to trace transactions-a property that supports illegal transactions. The results of our qualitative analysis elaborate on this tension and reveal Bitcoin's harms (challenges) that its designer may not have anticipated. Figure 1 portrays the Bitcoin adoption continuum: it illustrates how groups of individuals vary in their access to cryptocurrencies and regulated payment systems to carry out their transactions. We found that users conduct various types of transactions as they go about their daily lives, such as ecommerce payments; money transfers to friends, family, or employees; and payments for sensitive transactions that users may wish to keep confidential. The continuum serves as an appropriate tool to account for how individual use varies and how each transaction has dynamic sensitivity. The center of the continuum represents individuals who can use both cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and regulated monetary systems. The left of the continuum represents users who use cryptocurrencies to conduct sensitive and possibly illicit transactions (e.g., purchasing contraband on the dark Web) because they cannot use regulated monetary systems to do so. The extreme right of the continuum represents users who cannot use cryptocurrencies perhaps due to their inability to understand how to use and leverage cryptocurrencies or the costs associated with acquiring them. These users typically rely on traditional regulated monetary systems to carry out their daily transactions. Users can change their position along the continuum at any point depending on the nature of the transactions they wish to carry out and their competency in carrying out these transactions using cryptocurrencies.
Bitcoin Adoption Continuum
Based on our results, we attempted to understand Bitcoin adoption's benefits and harms among the five groups of individuals (i.e., innovators, conventional Bitcoin users, sensitive transaction users, potential Bitcoin non-adopters, and potential Bitcoin adopters).
Innovators, the first group, adopted Bitcoin early on. Although these users made transactions using regulated payment systems, new technology piqued their interest, and they tended to use Bitcoin for regular ecommerce such as buying, selling, and trading goods. Innovators already accepted Bitcoin as at least a partial substitute for traditional payment methods due to their perceived values about using it, such as newness, convenience, and time savings. Many innovators have also used Bitcoin-based applications such as Lawnmover or Sweatcoin. For innovators, adoption benefits included opportunities for investment and trade, transactions that avoid regulated monetary systems, and Bitcoin's robust technical features. However, for innovators, disadvantages included potential scams, the problems associated with negative social perception, and technical flaws such as blockchain bloat.
Conventional Bitcoin users, the second group, adopted Bitcoin after it gained social traction. They generally used Bitcoin for legitimate purposes such as ecommerce, investments, and remittances. For conventional Bitcoin users, adoption benefits included investment opportunities, the ability to conduct transactions that regulated monetary systems do not allow, and the ability to facilitate global ecommerce platforms. However, for conventional users, disadvantages included price volatility, low acceptance by merchants and financial institutions, and high transaction costs. Because innovators and conventional Bitcoin users engage in legitimate transactions, they can carry out their Bitcoin transactions using alternative regulated payment systems without violating laws or regulations. Thus, they have access to both Bitcoin and regulated payment systems.
Sensitive transaction users, the third group, used Bitcoin to engage in sensitive transactions due to the inherent risk of detection if processed through regulated financial systems (e.g., credit cards, checks). Regulated financial systems conduct know-your-customer (KYC) procedures to monitor the legality of customer transactions. Thus, they constrain some users from conducting sensitive transactions, such as money laundering and drug trafficking, for legal reasons. To a large extent, underground marketplaces such as those on the dark Web mandate that users use Bitcoin for payments, so users who conduct transactions there have no option but to use it. Another set of sensitive transaction users use Bitcoin to conceal legitimate transactions, such as buying legitimate prostitution or recreational marijuana. As Table  3 shows, adoption benefits for sensitive transaction users included Bitcoin's supporting sensitive transactions, privacy, anonymity, and risk mitigation. As Table 4 shows, we found two bitcoin non-user groups that did not have access to cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin non-users effectively could not access the cryptocurrency ecosystem altogether. Potential adopters, the fourth group, understood how Bitcoin works but were hesitant to use it. This group had not decided to replace traditional payment methods with cryptocurrencies. For potential adopters, benefits included Bitcoin's global adoption, robust technology validation features, and its ability to increase financial inclusion. For them, disadvantages included stigma, low network effects due to low adoption rates among vendors and individuals, and scams. Non-adopters, the second group, had no intention to adopt cryptocurrencies due to their potential disadvantages such as lack of physicality, stigma attached to their use, and volatility. This group may have heard of Bitcoin but potentially did not appreciate how it could empower their lives. For non-adopters, disadvantages included Bitcoin's lack of physicality, the stigma attached to its use, and volatility. This user group saw no benefits in Bitcoin since they did not intend to use it. 
Bitcoin's Underlying Value System in Practice
In this section, the second step of our VSD methodology, we group Bitcoin's benefits and harms and map them onto corresponding value categories. In Appendix D, we provide the definitions, descriptions, and anecdote examples we used to code these factors.
Access
Access refers to open and equal opportunity to use Bitcoin (Deng et al., 2016) . Factors that facilitate or hinder access to Bitcoin include its democratization of money, financial inclusion, global acceptance, usefulness, low network effects, and complexity.
A desire to democratize money represents a core philosophy behind Bitcoin's creation (Nakamoto, 2008) ; that is, to provide people (especially underserved populations) with open and equal access to monetary systems by facilitating peer-to-peer transfers. Respondents reported that they valued that Bitcoin democratized money. Democracy refers to a form of governance "by the people, of the people, and for the people" (Lincoln & Boritt, 1990) . The Bitcoin ecosystem follows a similar governance model: the Bitcoin protocol algorithmically validates Bitcoin transactions based on a "network of computer nodes" rather than a central governing authority such as a bank (Nakamoto, 2008) . Though Bitcoin mining has become resource intensive, ordinary individuals can participate in mining through cloud mining companies such as the Genesis Mining Pool.
Concerning financial inclusion, Bitcoin offers a means to include previously excluded users in the new financial system. For example, people who reside in locations with banking systems that do not allow people to conveniently open a bank account or access credit can gain financial access with Bitcoin. The cryptocurrency also provides a way to purchase products and services when one cannot or cannot easily use credit cards. It enables monetary systems in the underground economy, which regulated financial systems do not currently service. Further, Bitcoin has added appeal due to its potential to serve as a universal currency that lacks conversion fees. One can use Bitcoin for a wide variety of transactions, such as to replace credit card payments in ecommerce. Some merchants accept Bitcoin for retail purchases, business-to-business (B2B) transactions, and foreign exchange remittances.
Bitcoin facilitates transactions that may be illegal in some states or countries (e.g., buying and selling marijuana). For universal usability to occur, individuals must perceive that Bitcoin has high utility. We found that respondents believed that Bitcoin's properties-convenience, global payments, low transaction cost, safety, security, and liquidity-made it useful. However, various alternative digital payment mechanisms that provide users with the same or greater usefulness have also become popular over the years (e.g., PayPal). Further, most regulated financial institutions and businesses do not accept Bitcoin, which leads to low network effects.
Bitcoin's perceived complexity can be daunting. Some people feel overwhelmed by the technology's elaborate structure (e.g., software wallets with long private keys). Many non-users in the study pointed to the difficulty in using Bitcoin as money as a major deterrent to adopting it, though experts indicated to the contrary.
Laissez Faire
Laissez faire refers to the right for transactions between private parties to be free from government laws and regulation. Factors that facilitate or hinder bitcoin's laissez faire approach include freedom from regulation and regulatory challenges. In Appendix D, we present the definitions, descriptions, and anecdote examples we used to code these factors.
Some Bitcoin community members adopted the cryptocurrency because they believed that it exemplified libertarianism (i.e., a philosophical belief that values freedom from government regulation and intervention). Some users viewed this lack of regulation as contributing to their freedom to execute financial transactions and financial inclusion. One school of thought holds that formally regulating Bitcoin exchanges would improve adoption because it would require Bitcoin exchanges to follow legislation such as securities laws, which would minimize the risk that investors would face. On the one hand, insufficient regulation encourages innovation and faster adoption. On the other hand, insufficient regulation has led to Ponzi schemes and investment scams that have defrauded investors of millions of dollars (Kean, 2018) .
Current financial laws seem inadequate to handle all the regulatory challenges that abound in the cryptocurrency sector (Abramaowicz, 2016) . Although one can use Bitcoin for regular ecommerce, one can also use it to launder ill-gotten wealth (Jacquez, 2016) . Each country has its own laws to regulate Bitcoin fiat exchanges and to penalize criminal and civil offenses that individuals commit with Bitcoin. This legal gray area has led to lobbying efforts both for (typically from traditional financial forms) and against (typically from large cryptocurrency exchanges, investors, and startups who have invested in the economy's financial technology (fintech) sector) cryptocurrencies (De Filippi & Loveluck, 2016).
Efficiency
Efficiency refers to the ability to accomplish a task with minimal time and effort. Respondents also expressed concern about the energy that the computers that validate transactions consume due to the proof-of-work mechanism's complexity and the node network's ever-increasing size. However, despite these inefficiencies, interviewees noted that bitcoins have high fungibility because one can exchange them for other currencies (both fiat currencies and cryptocurrencies) through exchanges or in person with low fees and greater ease than most other forms of currency. 
Self-governance
Researchers have long acknowledged the challenge in managing globally distributed knowledge workers in a complex software development effort such as Bitcoin with volunteer software developers (Markus & Agres, 2000) . In such an environment, a community of volunteer software developers accomplishes complex tasks through consensus, discussion, and debates. Self-governance refers to the autonomous aspects of the Bitcoin ecosystem, which allow the ecosystem's various components (e.g., mining, application development, node maintenance) to operate without friction through commonly agreed-on systems and mechanics. The factors that facilitate or hinder self-governance include subcultural influences, self-regulation, lack of consensus, and concentration of mining power. In Appendix D, we provide the definitions, descriptions, and anecdote examples we used to code these factors.
A community refers to a group of people who regularly interact with one another and share a common values and needs (Kuznetsov, 2006 Successful open source software development usually arises when self-regulated teams that depend on consensus to make decisions about how they should develop the software and code participate with one another. Prominent self-regulated teams (e.g., Bitcoin, Mozilla Foundation, Linux) can work in unison to create these software products (i.e., continuous improvement of the software's quality with every new generation). The Bitcoin ecosystem includes self-motivated developers who usually efficiently resolve disagreements through mediation processes that community adopts (Roberts, Hann, & Slaughter, 2006) .
Researchers have often seen peer influence as contributing to whether disparate groups of individuals harmoniously function to accomplish a common goal. However, in situations with low peer influence, open source communities that lack a strong hierarchy or leadership find decision making difficult. These disagreements have spawned misunderstandings. For example, the decision to change Bitcoin's core source code to increase the block size has led to disagreements among developers, which caused a subsequent fork of the source code and resulted in Bitcoin Cash (Böhme, Christin, Edelman, & Moore, 2015; De Filippi & Loveluck, 2016) .
Cryptocurrency miners operate sophisticated computers with specialized software to validate transactions on the network in exchange for rewards in Bitcoin. Researchers have noted concentrated mining power as a barrier to self-governance because miners constitute a key component of Bitcoin's ecosystem (Böhme et al., 2015) . In some cases, concentrated mining power has enabled miners to collude to block new performance upgrades to the Bitcoin network. When conflicts among miners and developers develop into rifts, the Bitcoin network can fork in two (e.g., Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Main).
Ownership and Property
Ownership and property refer to the right to possess, use, manage, derive income from, and bequeath an object (or information) (Friedman et al., 2008) . Factors that facilitate or hinder ownership and property in the Bitcoin ecosystem include property rights, investment and trade, and lack of physicality.
Prior research shows that Bitcoin's owners have property rights: Bitcoin has all the properties that money does (Lo & Wang, 2015; Van Alstyne, 2014) . People can purchase, trade, and hold Bitcoin as an investment instrument. Some respondents preferred Bitcoin as a preferred portfolio diversification instrument because its price movements have no correlation (p < 0.5) with global stock price movements (Liu & Tsyvinski, 2018) . Bitcoin has greatly appreciated in value since its inception and provided substantial returns to individuals who acquired it early on. Miners also receive incentives for mining Bitcoin. The interviewees who invested in Bitcoin applications, such as cloud mining services and cryptocurrency games (e.g., FortuneJack or Crypto-Games.net), reported earning substantial financial returns. However, Bitcoin's lack of physicality hinders individuals from adopting it. Losing the private key can mean that one loses access to the bitcoins in it. Interviewees found this factor as a deterrent since they had become accustomed to physical money or electronic financial services. While some paper Bitcoin wallets exist, some respondents seemed to not know about their existence.
Privacy
Privacy refers to a person's claim, entitlement, or right to determine what information about themselves they or someone else can communicate to others (Friedman et al., 2008) . The factors that facilitate or hinder privacy in the Bitcoin ecosystem include anonymity and the privacy of sensitive transactions, lack of traceability, and transparent transactions.
Though one can trace Bitcoin transactions via wallet IDs, users perceive Bitcoin transactions to be anonymous-they believe they can mask their true identities on the network because transactions lack personal identifiable information. Many individuals use Bitcoin for sensitive transactions they want to carry out in secrecy. These transactions may or may not be legal, but the user wants to hide them because they may embarrass them or damage their reputation. Respondents reported that, for illegal transactions (e.g., transactions that involve drugs, prostitution, or money laundering), they prefer Bitcoin because the transactions avoid regulation and users can transfer coins globally without detection. Clandestine service providers such as drug dealers may demand payment in Bitcoin and, thereby, force buyers to use it. However, the lack of transaction traceability makes it difficult to hold persons accountable for their behavior in the Bitcoin ecosystem. While Bitcoin has a transparent public ledger that records every transaction, one cannot personally identify these transactions. As a result, one cannot easily (or at all) trace transactions to issue refunds or for legal purposes. Notwithstanding, some Bitcoin users who wish to hide a transaction's trail may find the difficulty in tracing transactions desirable.
Responsible Innovation
Responsible innovation refers to incorporating moral values in the innovation process and making innovations ethically, socially, and legally desirable. Designers who value responsible innovation work to benefit public welfare and prevent others from adopting their innovations for harmful purposes. Thus, designers need to weigh the long-term impact of their innovations.
The factors that facilitate or hinder responsible innovation in the Bitcoin ecosystem include social, legal, and ethical factors and poor environmental sustainability. In Appendix D, we provide the definitions, descriptions, and anecdote examples we used to code these factors. Respondents recognized the role that Bitcoin plays in responsible innovation by giving people access to monetary systems and lowering transaction costs. However, interviewees acknowledged that Bitcoin has technical features that have a negative social impact, such as allowing people to conduct illegitimate transactions on the dark Web. This shows that there is a need to innovate to make transactions safer and more responsible.
The cryptocurrency network comprises thousands of globally distributed computing nodes. To validate each transaction, cloud mining equipment uses a tremendous amount of electricity. As a result, many users feel that maintaining this financial system lacks sustainability and will hinder future adoption (i.e., the network spends more energy than it creates).
Trust
Trust involves the creation and fostering of relationships (Friedman et al., 2008) . People trust when they believe other people will not harm them even when they could (Friedman et al., 2008) . The factors that facilitate or hinder trust in the Bitcoin ecosystem include security, investment risk, risk mitigation, scams, stigma, volatility, irreversible transactions, and decentralization.
A secure system's performance characteristics include correctness, security, reliability, safety, and survivability (Friedman et al., 2008) . If users believe a system is secure, they will trust it. Also, Bitcoin may mitigate investment risk. While some people view Bitcoin use as risky because government or collateral do not back it, other users use Bitcoin as a risk-mitigation strategy. Bitcoin's ability to lower the risk of high-risk transactions constitutes an important feature (e.g., moving capital across geographic and economic boundaries to avoid capital controls). For example, Bitcoin can reduce the risk that a foreign bank will not accept currency because cryptocurrency exchanges across the world accept it. However, past exchange failures, such as occurred with the Mt. Gox exchange after hackers hacked it in 2011, have resulted in financial losses to users and harmed Bitcoin's public image. The cryptocurrency has also Volume 45 10.17705/1CAIS.04527 Paper 27 received significant negative publicity due to the perception that individuals primarily use it for illegal activity. Such incidents have damaged Bitcoin's reputation and its users have sensed this stigma (Ingram Bogusz & Morisse, 2018) .
As an investment instrument, Bitcoin's exchange rate fluctuates dramatically. Respondents expressed concern that Bitcoin constitutes an unsecured asset whose value depends on supply and demand in exchange markets. Users have no mechanism to recover money they may lose if exchanges fail or hackers hack their wallets. This potential for risk discouraged some respondents from using and investing in Bitcoin.
Once the blockchain validates and records Bitcoin transactions, they become irreversible. This mechanism creates a permanent transaction record and prevents double spending and fraud in the payment network (Subramanian, 2017) . This decentralized approach provides redundancy, safeguards against attacks, and minimizes the need for regulation. However, despite its advantages, respondents recognized that decentralized governance results in inefficient transaction processing in comparison with centralized transaction processing systems.
In summary, our results illuminate the relationship between usability and human values in the Bitcoin ecosystem. Sometimes usability and human values support each other, but they often also lack alignment. For example, Bitcoin supports access, an important human value. However, though Bitcoin has wide accessibility, facilitates financial inclusion, and sees use across the world, its borderless qualities promote money laundering and ransomware and fuels the deep Web and other types of criminal activity. Though Bitcoin's laissez faire approach presents regulatory challenges, its lack of regulation facilitates "borderless money" in countries with collapsing economies and dictatorships. For example, in Venezuela, Bitcoin provides an efficient monetary system that allows citizens to convert their assets to cryptocurrency in order to preserve their assets' value and purchase basic necessities such as food, which saves many lives (Hernandez, 2019) . Users value Bitcoin's efficiency and hyper-fungibility. At the same time, cryptocurrency exchanges impose high transaction costs to exchange Bitcoin with fiat money and other cryptocurrencies. Self-governance reduces costs due to no central governing body. However, selfgovernance also leads to discord in the ecosystem resulting in multiple forks, chaos, and user confusion. Bitcoin allows users to control ownership and property rights. However, if individuals become incapacitated, their next of kin or colleagues cannot reach Bitcoin assets if they do not share their private keys (Murphy, 2019) . As the Global Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union shows, individual privacy has become a significant concern that Bitcoin supports. However, an individual's ability to hide behind wallet or mixer ID's enables ransomware and blackmail to proliferate. With respect to responsible innovation, Nakamoto created Bitcoin for the public good. However, Bitcoin use has resulted in environmental concerns, high power consumption, and an elite group of cryptocurrency owners. Finally, in the Bitcoin ecosystem, trust is transferred to algorithms. Yet, because individuals often use Bitcoin for illicit activity, algorithmic trust is negated and Bitcoin is stigmatized, which prevents adoption. Accordingly, designers need to recognize the relationship between usability and human values to pursue alignment. In Section 5, we describe a research agenda that focuses on achieving greater alignment between usability and human values in designing and using cryptocurrencies. Friedman, Kahn and Borning (2008) recommend identifying opposing values (i.e., harms and benefits) as part of the VSD methodology. The IS literature has long recognized technology's dual and paradoxical outcomes (Robey & Boudreau, 1999) . Many technologies perform in successful, perverse, and paradoxical ways (Deng et al. 2016) . Researchers have found technologies that simultaneously cause harm (i.e., challenges for adopters) and benefits for various actors, such as individual users (Jarvenpaa & Lang, 2006) and mobile network users (Arnold, 2003) , and in various contexts, such as communities (Harris & Weiner, 1998) and crowdsourcing (Deng et al., 2016) . Our results illustrate a similar duality (benefits and harms/challenges) in values for each value category we identified for cryptocurrency. The values that Nakamoto (2008) envisioned for Bitcoin and the actual manifested values that adopters have encountered have often differed. For instance, Nakamoto purposefully designed Bitcoin as a decentralized, secure, unregulated, transparent, trust-free, and pseudo-anonymous ecosystem (Nakamoto, 2008) . However, these features also cause negative consequences such as illegal use, high transaction costs, and volatility due to speculation. By ameliorating these negative consequences, one could possibly increase the number of individuals and organizations that adopt and use all cryptocurrencies. For example, Ethereum has begun trying to reduce its energy footprint by adopting an energy-friendly proofing mechanism.
The Value-sensitive Design Framework and a Research Agenda for Cryptocurrencies
Next, we synthesize the value categories we discovered from our study into the following research themes that can guide future research in the IS domain. Table 5 maps the value categories we identified in the analysis to their corresponding research themes. Based on our analysis, we present the cryptocurrency value-sensitive design framework (see Figure 2 ). The innermost circle depicts Nakamoto's (2008) intended values: privacy, ownership and property, decentralization, efficiency, and trust. The middle circle depicts the values that the subjects in our study manifested. While several subjects manifested values consistent with Nakamoto's intended values (e.g., privacy, ownership and property), we also discovered newer value categories (e.g., access, laissez faire, responsible innovation, self-governance). This difference reveals opportunities for research and improvement. We suggest that these new value categories embody important criteria that might encourage users to adopt. To build on the original values and to capitalize on the opportunities in the new values we identified, we created six key research themes to highlight research areas that can inform researchers in the future. The outside circle depicts these research themes. The research themes include promoting access to cryptocurrency, reconciling privacy with surveillance, promoting responsible innovation, regulating cryptocurrencies, promoting trust, and promoting efficient cryptocurrencies. We depict value categories and their related research themes with the same colors. Next, we develop a cryptocurrency research agenda based on the framework in Figure 2 . 
Figure 2. Cryptocurrency Value-sensitive Design Framework
Developing a Cryptocurrency Research Agenda
As the final step in our VSD approach, we developed a research agenda for cryptocurrency design, adoption, and usage based on the above analysis. We first group the value categories that we identified into six research topics: 1) promoting access to cryptocurrencies, 2) reconciling need for privacy with need for surveillance, 3) regulating cryptocurrencies, 4) building efficient cryptocurrencies, 5) promoting responsible innovation in the cryptocurrency ecosystem, and 6) building a trustworthy cryptocurrency ecosystem. To validate this grouping externally, we had three doctoral candidates validate our categorization. We provide details about the external validity tests in Appendix C. Next, we pose questions that ask how IS research can contribute to each underlying theme.
The following examples represent some IS research opportunities. Note that many research suggestions we make build on overlapping and sometimes paradoxical underlying values.
Promoting Access to Cryptocurrencies
Bitcoin has spread partly due to its including transactions and individuals that the banking and/or credit system does not service. However, at a basic level, existing ecommerce infrastructure has a limited ability to facilitate cryptocurrency transactions, which constrains cryptocurrencies from growing and individuals from accessing it for everyday purchases. Users also find it difficult to understand how to invest in cryptocurrencies and how to use them to buy and sell products and services. Therefore, research and innovation efforts must not only evaluate the effectiveness of solutions that leverage cryptocurrency technology but also propose more user-friendly solutions.
A pertinent question concerns how we can promote disadvantaged people to adopt and use blockchain technologies. This important research question can inform scholars who can choose to perform studies in which they compare adoption among citizens in developed and developing countries and test their theory using models such as the technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) and unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003) .
Blockchain facilitates trustworthy transactions across geographic, economic, and social boundaries. As such, it can provide individuals with access to a wider social network due to the trust occurring on multiple dimen. For example, Dunbar's (1992 Dunbar's ( , 2002 number-a principle that posits an individual's optimal social group size to be 150-demonstrates that the brain's human neocortex, not ecological or environmental factors, limit an individual's social group size. However, by using the blockchain, individuals can surpass this limit because they lower ecological barriers to trust due to the way blockchain innovations such as smart contract applications and messaging platforms distribute trust. These innovations provide the means with which individuals can increase their social group size, social scalability, and network effects.
Precisely how blockchain applications such as cryptocurrencies may lead to social scalability represents a promising research area. For instance, scholars could investigate how cryptocurrencies enable social scalability by breaking Dunbar's number. To study this question, scholars could investigate Bitcoin transactions by using data from Bitcoin's or Ethereum's smart contract applications such as Cryptokitties, or by using other means such as social network analyses. Researchers could analyze blockchain data from messaging platforms such as Telegram and Kik to understand factors such as a user's social network's social reach and the scalability when platforms issue cryptocurrency tokens to their users. Researchers have already conducted some such studies in computer science and sociology to analyze the effect that Twitter has on Dunbar's number (Gonçalves, Perra, & Vespignani, 2011) .
If IS researchers more commonly studied the evolving landscape of cryptocurrency applications, we could develop new theoretical understandings about how to promote organizations to adopt and use cryptocurrencies in their point-of-sale systems and electronic funds transfer systems. Such an investigation might entail studying consumer behavior at ATMs that support cryptocurrency and point-ofsale systems such as BitPay. By qualitatively investigating why consumers adopt Bitcoin at these places, scholars could better understand the advantages in using such systems. Similarly, newer business models such as Purse.io that encourage users to barter Bitcoin for goods on ecommerce sites could enable researchers to delve into the socioeconomic factors that lead to cryptocurrency adoption across society. Table 6 proposes research opportunities that promote access to cryptocurrencies. 
Reconciling the Need for Privacy with the Need for Surveillance
Bitcoin exists in a state of tension between anonymity and traceability (Ballis, 2017) . Computer science researchers have conducted most prior research on these cryptocurrency issues, though researchers have not yet considered the sociotechnical implications. From a technical standpoint, though Bitcoin lacks full anonymity, prior research confirms that several services anonymize transactions in the Bitcoin ecosystem with some success (Möser et al, 2013) , such as Bitcoin mixer BitLaundry. Admittedly, individuals often use Bitcoin mixers for money laundering and other criminal activities, but transaction anonymization has many legitimate purposes as well. For example, it would benefit the healthcare industry since many donors have a legitimate interest in maintaining their financial privacy. Moreover, Bitcoin mixers can provide transaction anonymity by directing all transactions through a single trustworthy service and disguising incoming and outgoing transactions (Möser et al., 2013) . A service can provide more anonymity if a large number of independent users uses the service. With that said, Bitcoin mixers do come with security risks: untrustworthy mixers have traced or stolen coins (Sasson et al., 2014) .
One can also assure privacy in cryptocurrency transactions by developing new services with privacy built into the design (Ballis, 2017) , such as Zerocash, an alternative cryptocurrency that used cutting-edge cryptography to hide all information from the blockchain except for transactions' existence. Based on this mechanism, each transaction included a cryptographic, publicly verifiable proof of its own validity (Sasson et al., 2014) . On this basis, research scholars could investigate how one could build user-verifiable transaction anonymizers with provable anonymity and security guarantees. They could also investigate how to deter individuals from using transaction anonymizers for money laundering and other criminal activity. Researchers may execute these studies by using cryptocurrency exchange data or mixer-related data for cryptocurrency trade or transfer (e.g., data from Kraken, Coinbase, Robinhood, or Bithumb) to analyze users' behaviors with respect to transaction anonymizers. One can use taint analysis tools to, for instance, evaluate how much anonymity a service can provide (Möser et al., 2013) . However, researchers need to develop more accurate and reliable evaluation tools. To enable one to trace transactions, researchers could use advanced transaction graph-analysis techniques to analyze the blockchain to reveal cash flow and other financial details (Ballis, 2017) .
Specific issues surrounding transactions' privacy and traceability arise when governments become involved in issuing cryptocurrencies. Several governments have considered either replacing their existing fiat currency with a cryptocurrency equivalent or issuing a new cryptocurrency (such as Petrocoin in Venezuela) to increase liquidity in their financial systems. In cases where organizations enforce central control and the acquirers may be disclosed, we need to examine how users, issuers, and other participants in the ecosystem may change. Scholars have also analyzed the conflict between privacy and surveillance in modern nation states (Neyland, 2006; Stanton & Stam, 2006) . However, scholars need to study how removing transaction privacy in the cryptocurrency ecosystem affects user adoption and use, which they can do by conducting case studies on privately issued initial coin offers (ICOs) or firmcontrolled coins (JioCoin). Generally speaking, blockchain transaction confidentiality is critical for governments, enterprises, and individuals-a sociotechnical issue that will affect adoption decisions. Therefore, we need more work that examines how to balance privacy needs with the extent to which one can trace transactions to personally identifiable information. Researchers can investigate the possible legal mechanisms for cryptocurrency users to ensure that cryptocurrencies maintain privacy while preventing illegal use. They can combine digital forensic techniques, such as tracing Internet protocol (IP) addresses or mining logs, with transaction analysis and graph theoretical construction to identify loops and other structures that can identify mixing, money laundering, and currency-exchange manipulation. Such studies can prevent illegal use and assist law enforcement in detecting fraud and enforcing legitimacy. We highlight the potential research opportunities related to reconciling needs for privacy with needs for surveillance in Table 7 . What impact does removing transaction privacy in the cryptocurrency ecosystem have on user adoption and use?
One can use live case studies for privately issued ICO or firm-controlled coins (e.g., JioCoin, Petrocoin, Augur).
What legal mechanisms can one offer to cryptocurrency users to ensure that cryptocurrencies maintain their privacy while preventing them from using it for illegal purposes?
One can measure privacy as specified by a cryptocurrency. To do so, one can use a combination of digital forensic techniques, such as tracing IP addresses and accessing information from exchanges.
Regulating Cryptocurrencies
A lack of regulatory harmonization impedes efforts to regulate global cryptocurrency (Harasic, 2014) . The United States treats Bitcoin ownership similarly to share and equity ownership. Given this trend, U.S. Government agencies have begun attempting to regulate these new currencies. While such regulations remain limited, U.S. agencies including the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have exerted jurisdiction over Bitcoin. For instance, before its failure, Mt. Gox had to register with FinCEN because U.S. agencies considered it a money transmitter. Some U.S. courts have also ruled that Bitcoin constitutes money. Some may also view Bitcoin transactions as investment contracts equivalent to securities that SEC law governs in some types of transactions such as ICOs. The IRS considers bitcoins taxable property, and the CFTC considers Bitcoin a commodity. However, regulators still have limited powers over cryptocurrencies. As such, the SEC has warned that investors should "exercise caution" with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and noted that state and federal regulators may not be able to recoup any lost investments from illegal actors (Schroeder, 2018) .
Other countries such as India treat Bitcoin ownership as similar to real estate. Bitcoin adoption has been slow in India. Though the Reserve Bank of India has endorsed blockchain technology, it has not yet endorsed cryptocurrencies. Japan's cabinet has officially recognized virtual currencies, including Bitcoin, as real money. The Chinese Government has sought to impose restrictions on Chinese citizens' investments in Bitcoin, but its manipulation of its currency has recently led to large Bitcoin trading as an alternative investment strategy. Despite its restrictions, China produces the most bitcoins in the world. Thus, the country represents a powerful force because, collectively, Chinese miners can reject any new improvements to the Bitcoin protocol.
Therefore, researchers could study what rules or regulations should governments impose on exchanges, traders, and systems to prevent individuals from illegally using Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. Such a question could involve studying legal frameworks in existing countries and jurisdictions and comparing the outcomes of such legal frameworks in enabling the cryptocurrency economy to grow without causing disruptions to social order. The dissimilar approaches world governments now use to regulate cryptocurrencies affect the tax rates they impose on selling cryptocurrencies and how they monitor the global flow of cryptocurrency movement. Though different governments' disparate regulatory efforts have stemmed some problems in the cryptocurrency ecosystem, they have also demonstrated that governments do not fully understand and lack the preparation to deal with cryptocurrencies.
U.S. legal scholars have proposed regulatory solutions to the challenges that cryptocurrencies present, such as regulations that make assurances similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) protections for bank depositors to mitigate users' losses in hacking situations (McLeod, 2017) . However, this approach would break the pseudo-anonymity that cryptocurrencies currently provide because implementing it would require some type of identification. Legal scholars have also focused on regulating Bitcoin under a "quasi-security" framework with its own regulatory legislation (Harasic, 2014) .
The U.S. Government released tax regulations for Bitcoin in 2014 in the form of IRS Notice 2014-21. Accordingly, investigating how governments should treat cryptocurrencies and cryptocurrency trade for taxation purposes represents a pertinent research question that would require collaboration between legal and IS scholars.
From a technical perspective, transaction anonymization presents regulatory issues and increases cryptocurrencies' susceptibility to criminal use. One solution involves enforcing know-your-customer (KYC) procedures at the edges of the cryptocurrency system, where individuals exchange cryptocurrencies for conventional currencies or products and services. Researchers could investigate how to create KYC approaches that preserve privacy and deter illegal Bitcoin use. Researchers could also investigate how to identify suspicious activities in the blockchain and hold perpetrators accountable for their real-world transactions (Möser et al., 2013) . Other regulatory strategies include blacklisting suspicious transactions or account holders. Governments could legally mandate entities that operate in the cryptocurrency ecosystem to observe official transaction blacklists. A promising research direction could involve investigating how to develop data-mining or artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to blacklist suspicious transactions and account holders.
Globally, conflicting views on the impact of regulating cryptocurrencies exist. Predominant views indicate that regulations will either protect legitimate users or fall flat by creating inefficiencies that produce no measurable success. Therefore, future research can examine how to regulate national cryptocurrencies. Such research could include analyzing different legal frameworks for cryptocurrency across the world. Moreover, IS scholars could examine and contribute to formulating policy frameworks by actively working with members in the legal community who work in contract law, criminal law, civil litigation, and forensic law. Table 8 summarizes potential research opportunities in regulating cryptocurrencies. 
Promoting Efficient Cryptocurrencies
Blockchain technology offers a distributed software architecture (Xu et al., 2016 ) that enables transparent, secure, and tamper-free data transaction records with no central failure point. Nevertheless, blockchain systems still represent an emergent technology and exhibit various problems that we need to solve. For instance, efficiency and scalability issues related to security, network size, limited transaction loads, and high computational costs continue to pose problems.
Therefore, a need to balance blockchain's security features with the cryptocurrency ecosystem's efficiency exists. Consequently, researchers could examine how one could make blockchain and other underlying technologies for cryptocurrencies more scalable, secure, and cost effective. To investigate this research question, IS scholars would do well to study complex software systems' architecture and propose design mechanisms for scalability. Such an approach could involve conducting research on how to better design distributed databases and distributed computing. The Ethereum project has begun prototyping multiple solutions to address energy efficiency through 1) rolling out proof-of-stake mechanisms that will reduce the energy requirements for validating transactions and 2) implementing scalability through sharding mechanisms that increase transaction throughput to market levels.
Transaction costs play an important role in improving the marketing system's efficiency. If higher than the actual transaction value, transaction costs may discourage cryptocurrency use. Markets determine transaction costs because they compensate miners for performing complex mining tasks. Transaction fees can increase based on increased workload since nodes in the network write more data onto chains during high-demand periods. Miners who confirm transactions may choose to ignore transactions that offer lower fees. As a result, transactions may remain unconfirmed for a long time. Therefore, we need understand mechanisms that determine transaction costs. Accordingly, scholars could study what behavioral or technical modifications one could make in cryptocurrency ecosystems to reduce transaction costs. They could also study the economics of decentralized systems' design and model such systems analytically to simulate various scenarios. Based on the abovementioned concepts, we list the research issues related to promoting efficient cryptocurrencies in Table 9 . Employ database design concepts such as sharding and distributed computation to solve scalability challenges.
What behavioral or technical modifications can one make in ecosystems to reduce transaction costs?
Study transaction characteristics of Bitcoin and Ethereum protocols to analyze supply-demand characteristics and the role transaction costs play in them.
Promoting Responsible Innovation in the Cryptocurrency Ecosystem
We mention two key worthy research issues that fall under the responsible innovation umbrella. The first issue concerns the idea of environmentally sustainable cryptocurrencies. The IS research community has long acknowledged that green IS initiatives could considerably improve poor environmental practices. Researchers have actually proposed energy informatics as an IS subdiscipline (Watson, Boudreau, & Chen, 2010) . Energy informatics involves analyzing, designing, and implementing systems to increase the efficiency of energy demand and supply systems (Watson et al., 2010) . This approach requires scholars to collect and analyze energy data sets to better optimize energy distribution and consumption networks. Along these lines, many studies outside of the IS discipline have examined cryptocurrencies' sustainability with conflicting results. Currently, the cryptocurrency ecosystem consumes enormous amounts of power on mining cryptocurrencies. Based on energy consumption alone, some studies suggest that paper money, goods, and banking systems have higher environmental costs than Bitcoin (Giungato, Rana, & Tarabella, & Tricase, 2017; McCook, 2015) . One study notes that Bitcoin's energy consumption exceeds the electricity that Ireland consumes (O'Dwyer & Malone, 2014) . Admittedly, depending on cryptocurrencies' exchange rate, the energy that mining consumes may exceed its rewards. Research posits that, should the entire monetary system transition to cryptocurrency, maintaining the system would consume an excessive amount of energy (Giungato et al., 2017) . For such reasons, cryptocurrencies' prospective energy demands may constrain the cryptocurrency ecosystem and new innovative application stream from evolving. Still, creating sustainable cryptocurrency applications and developing novel ways to use IS to manage the energy footprint constitute promising research avenues.
Cryptocurrencies' energy requirements seriously threaten their viability; as a result, scholars need to research sustainability and provide solutions to this issue. Scholars could examine how one can use different information systems to reduce the energy footprint of various parts of the cryptocurrency ecosystem. Empirically, scholars should device measures and monitor the energy footprint for each component of the ecosystem (e.g., mining algorithms, network nodes, transmission relays, etc.) to estimate the total energy the ecosystem consumes. They could predict and postulate the viability of such systems and suggest research methods to improve their sustainability. Scholars could also develop innovations for the public good. In particular, developing innovative solutions for the socioeconomically disadvantaged as we describe in Section 5.1 also represents a form of responsible innovation that falls under the social sustainability umbrella. Table 10 highlights the potential research opportunities in promoting responsible innovation in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. 
Responsible innovation
How can IS reduce the energy footprint of various parts of the cryptocurrency ecosystem (i.e., miners and nodes)?
Modify cryptocurrency mining algorithms to suit other modes (e.g., proof of stake) to reduce power consumption.
Promoting Trust in the Cryptocurrency Ecosystem
Among their advantages, cryptocurrencies transfer trust from an individual to a network of distributed system nodes that operate without interference. But, trust issues do exist in the open source community responsible for developing cryptocurrencies. These trust issues may lead to a research stream related to this community's self-governance. Many IS scholars have studied open source software-development practices (Roberts et al., 2006) . However, they have conducted their studies mostly in contexts related to freely distributed software for public use (e.g., Mozilla Foundation projects, Linux core development, the MIT-X open consortium). Scholars have studied incentives, motivational factors, and developer contributions in this space. However, with cryptocurrency, executable software code that software developers control and manage has come to bear economic value. The financial and economic impacts of Blockchain software implementations have the potential to cause conflicts of interest among actors across the ecosystem.
To preserve the original values behind Bitcoin and overcome present challenges, the cryptocurrency community, which includes miners, developers, users, node operators, exchanges, and application developers, must agree on important decisions such as source code updates. Predictably, mining companies would prefer not to have frequent source code updates or rollouts, which would disrupt their earning potential. In the past, disagreement on approaches to scaling the Bitcoin blockchain in the community has stalled two performance updates. When differences become irreconcilable, developers sometimes create two versions of the core software with minor modifications through a process known as forking, which creates a sister token on the network. In turn, such forks can erode the parent coin's value. Overall, open source development on the blockchain has significant implications for earning potential that also introduce potential conflicts with social welfare. To mitigate potential controversy, each innovative initiative should consider all stakeholders' views in order to increase the social welfare of all participants in the network. Arriving at an optimal solution that benefits all stakeholders requires strong leadership and effective governance mechanisms.
Therefore, consider the following research question: how can the open source community create a governance framework with multiple stakeholders to support major initiatives? To answer such a question, scholars need to model and empirically measure different stakeholders' incentives, which often conflict. For example, miners have an incentive to retain the same source code version, whereas developers and traders have an incentive to move to a more efficient code base. Among their attractive features, any financial institution or mechanism provides security to their end users. However, IS research about security mainly focuses on issues that one cannot easily apply to the Bitcoin ecosystem, such as computer abuse in organizations (Straub & Nance, 1990) , security compliance (Smith, Winchester, Bunker, & Jamieson, 2010) , and executives' perspectives on security management (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992) . To supplement these perspectives, prior research about security issues in the Bitcoin ecosystem has focused on identifying Bitcoin's main characteristics, such as decentralization, deregulation, embedded expertise, reputation, transactions' transparency, low cost, and their impacts on trust (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017) .
Smart contracts-agreements between two or more parties that blockchain programs automatically enforce without an intermediary-have become a popular topic in cryptocurrency research recently (Ballis, 2017) . Two of the most popular cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum, allow users to create smart contracts. A smart contract can encode any set of rules represented in its programming language. But, regardless of platform, smart contracts have security vulnerabilities. Smart contract platforms operate in open (or permission-less) networks where arbitrary participants can participate, which makes these contracts vulnerable to manipulation from, for example, miners and contract users (Luu, Chu, Olickel, Saxena, & Hobor, 2016) . For example, Ethereum and Bitcoin allow miners to decide which transactions to accept, how to order transactions, and to set the block timestamp, which makes transactions open to manipulation. Research has previously examined how to eliminate bugs from smart contracts (Luu et al., 2016) . Nevertheless, smart contracts can implement a wide range of applications (e.g., financial instruments, money transfers, savings wallets, wills, outsourced computations, and decentralized gambling), which offers many research possibilities. IS scholars could study how we can measure trust, monitor trust, and improve trust between different stakeholders in a self-governing techno-financial system. Further, they could examine whether the many stakeholders in the ecosystem, such as miners, developers, evangelists, consumers, and coin accepters, perceive systemic trust.
Not all individuals trust cryptocurrencies; thus, scholars have room to conduct research initiatives that focus on devising better approaches for assuring individuals trust the blockchain. The blockchain creates a trust-free environment by replacing governing institutions or interpersonal trust with cryptographic protocols and decentralized consensus algorithms (Notheisen et al., 2017) . Thus, humans have increasingly needed to trust in algorithms rather than traditional institutions (Lustig & Nardi, 2015) . Studies on algorithmic trust in the Bitcoin ecosystem suggest that algorithmic trust involves not only trust in the algorithm to function correctly but also trust in the various sociotechnical factors in the Bitcoin ecosystem scholars have yet to explore and understand (Lustig & Nardi, 2015) . The very concept of a trust-free system actually remains somewhat unclear: one could argue that trust would shift from central institutions or market authorities to algorithms (Notheisen et al., 2017) . If so, how reliable are algorithmic forms of trust when replacing other forms of transactions, such as those between firms and individuals or between individuals and institutions? Table 11 organizes research opportunities for promoting trust in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. How effective are algorithmic forms of trust?
One can measure trust when one removes the intermediary from the picture (e.g., using smart contracts). One can validate smart contracts and their impact on existing contracts and businesses.
Self-governance
How can the open source community create a governance framework with multiple stakeholders with different incentives to support major initiatives?
Study core teams' open source development policy and miners', nodes', and others' incentives to adopt changes that benefit users without compromising security that the network rolls out. A game theoretic analysis of the stakes of different actors in the ecosystem might uncover strategies to arrive at an equilibrium that benefits all actors. 
Limitations
As with any study, ours has several limitations. First, we acknowledge that, while we used students and working professionals as respondents in our study, some did not fully know about Bitcoin's features and could have responded without well-founded knowledge. However, our study also included experts and individuals who adopted the technology early on, which provides a more balanced view. Second, our value-sensitive design approach applied an individual adoption perspective and not a business enterprise perspective. Future studies could extend our study by exploring cryptocurrencies' benefits and disadvantages from an enterprise viewpoint. Finally, since most our respondents (about 90 percent) lived in the United States, cultural differences could have affected perspectives about the values. That being said, many (about 60 percent) were born in another country. Future research could extend this study to other cultures that either accept cryptocurrencies more (e.g. countries in the European Union) or less (e.g., India or China). Despite these limitations, this study contributes to more systematically explaining cryptocurrencies' benefits and harms from the individual perspective since it builds on grounded analytical techniques applied to VSD principles. We believe our study provides a strong foundation for future research on related cryptocurrency topics.
Conclusion
We found that individuals have varied values about Bitcoin and extended the values of the cryptocurrency's original designers. Accordingly, we developed an IS research agenda to focus on nextgeneration cryptocurrency innovations that leverage democratic, decentralized public ledgers. The research agenda can add value to people and organizations and provide socioeconomic benefits to disadvantaged communities. As such, our research agenda considers cryptocurrency's benefits and harms (challenges) and suggests further research to understand the implications of these manifested values.
While IS researchers initially received encouragement to leverage theories from emerging research in other disciplines, they must also contribute to this expanding knowledge base by offering a specifically IS perspective. We hope this paper leads IS researchers to become prolific contributors by building on existing knowledge in the discipline and adding to the growing literature on cryptocurrencies. Why would you use this cryptocurrency compared to the others? Appendix B: Demographics of the Survey Population
Phase One
Phase one involved 12 male full-time professionals between 25 and 42 years old. They earned between US$50,000 and $150,000 per annum. Table B1 . Phase Two Survey Population Demographics (N = 110)
Phase Two
Age
Employment status Country of origin
Gender: 55% male, 45% female; annual income ranged between US$0 and $65,000; 80% of respondents did not use cryptocurrency. Coding constitutes the most basic and the most fundamental process in grounded theory development.
Phase Three
We first collected the data by interviewing subjects based on questions in Appendix A. We then imported the transcriptions for the recorded interviews and email interviews into NVIVO 11. Using NVIVO, the coders coded line-by-line, sentence-by-sentence, paragraph-by-paragraph, page-by-page, and sectionby-section. The smaller the unit of analysis, the more numerous the descriptive categories that initially emerged. Line-by-line analysis ensured that we "grounded" our analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990 ).
Open Coding
Open coding involved developing several low-level codes for the benefits and harms of using Bitcoin (106 to be exact). Two coders then independently developed agreement metrics for these codes. If the interrater reliability (IRR) metric and Cohen's kappa metric did not reach 75 percent and 0.75, respectively, they repeated this step until they reached an acceptable agreement level. Once the coders finalized the coding schema with these metrics, they proceeded to independently code the other data (110 student email interviews and 41 expert interviews). At the end of open coding, we obtained an IRR over 75 percent and a Cohen's kappa over 0.75.
Axial Coding
We then combined the open codes to form higher-level codes that represented values in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. For example, to derive the code "security", we combined open codes for secure transactions, unhackable, and so on under the "security" axial code. The coding paradigm we used clearly defined interactions among the open codes. For example, in the value-sensitive design approach for the three open codes we mention above, we asked the question: "What codes indicate increased "trust" for Bitcoin adopters?". We defined this higher level "trust" code with examples (or annotations from our interview) and formed our value category. While some open codes formed the core of the "trust" value category (e.g., "security", "stigma", etc.), others such as "secure transaction support", "negative image", and so on formed peripheral descriptive codes that we categorized as subcodes. We present the axial codes as "value categories" in Table 2 . Further, we shared the definitions for each open code and the axial codes with external scholars (doctoral students) who validated the content by independently categorizing the open codes into axial codes. We then calculated the IRR. If the IRR did not reach 75 percent, we proceeded to distill and combine a few more open codes with existing ones until the doctoral students obtained an IRR greater than 75 percent. To reconcile differences, we often conducted a brief meeting to resolve differences. Next, we categorized the axial codes into selective codes.
Selective Codes
We combined the axial further to form higher-level codes known as selective coding to create "research themes". Much past IS research that has used the VSD approach has focused on providing future directions to scholars, practitioners, and designers based on analyzing existing values underlying IS usage (Deng et al., 2016) . In the manuscript, we present the selective codes as "research themes" based on the "axial codes" (value categories) (see Table 2 ).
External Content Validity Tests and Iteration
Once we completed the coding schema and categorization (i.e., values -> value categories -> research themes), we asked three doctoral candidates to independently use a q-sorting process to validate the categorization. The content validity tests showed an IRR of 69 percent in the first iteration. We subsequently refined the coding, definitions, and categorizations. The doctoral candidates conducted the q-sorting process a second time, which resulted in an inter-coder reliability close to 90 percent. Below, we represent schematically the research method we followed in our study. The act of making money accessible to everyone by making everyone a stakeholder. Democratization also means that individuals believe they have a stake in how much money is available and printed-a facet of the algorithm that mines and releases Bitcoin into the network.
"Bitcoin is for the underserviced. It is for people who don't have bank accounts, what you are trying to do in a lot of ways is provide access to the underserviced."
Financial inclusion (benefit)
Including people whom the formal financial system currently excludes.
"It's for an economy which is not being serviced by other technologies."
Global acceptance (benefit) Universal currency accepted globally without conversion effects.
"Immigrants send a lot of money overseas, and Bitcoin can reduce their fees and time to send and receive." "Someone in Saudi Arabia can send me a dollar and fifty cents. For me that is one of the uses."
Usefulness (benefit)
A technology property that allows one to use the technology or coin for multiple purposes.
"I use it for sending money to children, who are in college." "To create an anonymous way to purchase almost anything on the World Wide Web." "Profit potential, tax protection, prestige/cool value, Crypto allows a constant value for a medium of exchange outside of government oversight. Ultimate tax shelter."
Low network effects (harm)
A phenomenon whereby a product or service gain additional value as more people use it.
"I have used it for payment but am waiting for more places to accept it." "There are not too many places that accept Bitcoin."
Complexity (harm)
A technology property that makes it complex to understand and often filled with communication difficulties.
"The technical jargon is daunting and the Satoshi as a unit in millions scares newbies." "Bitcoin has incomprehensible tech." "There needs to be a simpler understanding for people to use it in everyday transactions." "The UI/UX for most cryptocurrencies is very difficult for most people to understand."
Difficult to use (harm)
A cryptocurrency property wherein users find it difficult to use.
"Bitcoin is difficult to use." "How do I acquire bitcoin?" "I don't understand the technology?" "Lack of regulatory clarity especially for financial services." "Overall political lobbying for crypto-laws can harm the ecosystem." Network latency-high latency.
Blockchain bloat-the blockchain stores all transactions historically. However, in addition to transaction information, users can write data into the record. This causes an exponential increase in the size of the blockchain.
The time it takes to validate a transaction between two parties is exceedingly large (between 1 and 45 minutes), which does not allow for e-commerce or other real-time fund transfers.
"Right now, the transaction fees are small-it's [the blockchain] going to be a giant wall of pxxxxx [irrelevant content such as comments, images, etc.]." "You can write stuff into transactions; i.e., there is no incentive to NOT write pxxxxx onto the blockchain." "Transaction times are getting unmanageable."
High transaction costs (harm)
High transaction costs increase barriers to entry.
"The tollbooths (the transaction fees paid to third parties when Bitcoin is exchanged for fiat currencies at ATMs or at physical locations) are expensive; sometimes it is 12.5% and 15%."
Hyper-fungible (benefit)
Easily exchangeable or replaceable with other currencies in comparison to other regulated fiat currencies.
"It is so fungible. What is nice is it is digital and it is fungible."
High mining costs (harm)
Mining Bitcoins (i.e., for the equipment and for the power) has a high cost.
"Mining has become too expensive unless you have subsidized electricity."
Robust technical features (benefit)
Whether the software lacks backs and whether it operates flawlessly despite heavy network use.
"When I look at a cryptocurrency, I look at the hash rate. How much energy is burnt in creating the currency? How resistant is it to hacking? How censorship unfriendly is the currency?" "I look for infrastructure, liquidity, proof of work, hashing algorithm, etc."
Technical limitations (harm) Doubts regarding basic technical and functional requirements of Bitcoin (e.g., scalability, the encryption algorithm's robustness, futureproofness).
"In future, will it be hacked? Can someone manipulate transactions?"
High-energy consumption (harm)
The property of Bitcoin's network to require large amounts of energy to operate.
"The bitcoin network consumes more energy than Ireland." Supports the subculture of a group of people who regularly interact with each other and share a common set of interests, values, and needs.
Communications of the
"Bitcoin is like a meta-nation. There is a set of people who form a subculture. The Bitcoin embassies are an extension of that I'm dialed (connected) up to a lot of people, networks all over the world. I just call them up, and we talk about random stuff, not necessarily Bitcoin. I might be going to Thailand; they will give you money if you need money. You have a shared language, shared culture, and shared money. There is a lot of social value (from participating in the Bitcoin economy)."
Self-regulation (benefit)
An organization that regulates itself without intervention from external parties.
"Peer influence is a driving factor (in this ecosystem)."
Lack of consensus (harm)
The property of open source communities that do not have a strong hierarchy or a leadership whereby decision-making processes can be extremely difficult.
"Community lost trust in the protocol or community fractures more and more into competing forks."
Concentration of mining power (harm)
Mining measured in mega hashes per second has increasingly become controlled by large corporations that can scale their operations due to the need to buy specialized hardware and pay large power bills. As a result, a concentration in mining power arises since a few large players control the market.
"concentration of power in miners hands is a bane" "51% of the miners are in 1 country." "No it didn't succeed and it won't allow miners hold the power to software upgrades." The property whereby one can physically hold and account for something.
"I can't physically carry it around with me like I can with cash." "No bank means there is no evidence if the account is from a real person or computer generated."
Investment and trade (benefit)
A Bitcoin property that allows one to use it as an investment instrument. "I hold Bitcoin." "I use Bitcoin to speculate." "It is a safe investment away from government's prying eyes."
Property rights (benefit)
The ability to indisputably claim one owns assets. "I control my money."
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A "It costs about (several) million dollars to validate transactions. It's a machine that runs on energy and works so that the underserviced can be serviced." The quality or state of being unknown or unidentifiable.
"People use it for peer-to-peer anonymous transactions."
Lack of traceability (harms)
The ability to hide various aspects of a transaction (e.g., value, identities of senders/receivers, time, etc.) from anyone (e.g., governments, legal enforcement agencies, etc.) not involved in the transaction.
"Obvious reasons why someone (would use it) is hiding the trail."
Transparent transactions (benefit)
The blockchain's nature to record each and every transaction and the end user's ability to query the blockchain for the transaction using services such as blockchain.info. "Information is transparent." "Since the technology is still new, there are multiple outlets in which these "coins" are shown to have "bugs" in them, allowing for the transparency of the Blockchain to be obfuscated...defeating the purpose of keeping transactions visible to anyone." "My main focus is on insurance-related products that are cheaper and more transparent." Implies controls that provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability for all system components.
Communications of the
"Security! More secure than the current monetary systemever loose that 10 dollar bill you stuck in your pocket or got stolen out of your glove compartment" (Cannot happen with crypto unless you lose your private key or personally hand over your money). "The bitcoin Blockchain is far more secure than other systems"
Stigma (harm)
Projects an undesirable and untrustworthy image for anyone associated with it through association.
"We've all been robbed…You have to suspend a lot of beliefs (to buy Bitcoin)-(Many) young people are robbed or scammed…Most of us lose Bitcoins running behind ideas thinking bad ideas are good ideas and then lose out. I put money in a very bad scam with a 1% return per day".
Volatility (harm)
The standard deviation of exchange price as compared to other assets (e.g., USD or gold).
"These cryptocurrencies are more established and fluctuate less" "Bitcoin is more volatile than any other asset"
Investment risk (harm)
The ability of an asset class to receive backing from government collateral (guarantee) or some form of insurance from a bank.
"Banks or governments don't guarantee the value".
"If my bitcoin is stolen no one will return it to me" Irreversible transactions (benefit) Permanently recorded, irreversible transaction.
"Irreversible transactions in which bitcoin's payment method is 100% irreversible and cannot be charged back."
